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It has been thirty-three months since the United States was attacked by terrorists 
on September 11th 2001.  Yet, in distributing grants to States and localities to build their 
capacity for homeland security, the Nation continues to rely on funding formulae that are 
deeply flawed.  Many grants are distributed in ways that ignore need-driven criteria, such 
as where terrorists are most likely to strike and which targets are most critical.  This 
thesis develops an alternative formula that takes need into account (and therefore is much 
more likely to send funds where they are required).  After reviewing need-driven 
formulae from a range of fields that might be applied to homeland security, I use the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to break the objectives of homeland security 
capacity-building into discreet, measurable components.  Then, I analyze the criteria that 
should be used to build a grant allocation process to accomplish those objectives, 
including population density, criticality of infrastructure, the threat to a municipality, 
vulnerability to that threat, and terrorism prevention. The resulting formula is far better 
structured than the current system to put homeland security grant funds where the Nation 
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The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security provides an excellent 
opportunity to improve the allocation of assistance funds to States and localities through 
the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP).  Currently, many of the ODP funding 
calculations are based either on arbitrary allocations mandated by Congress or by per 
capita-based allocations.  This approach ignores the fact that some jurisdictions face a 
more severe threat than others, and therefore should receive greater funding.  Moreover, 
States can (and usually do) withhold 20% of the funding they receive under the present 
funding programs, even in cases where a threat-driven analysis would indicate that cities 
would deserve a greater (or, in some cases, lesser) funding share.  
This thesis argues that threat-driven approaches can and should be incorporated 
into the allocation of funding by ODP.  This thesis looks at many other funding options 
that have been used in other agencies as well as different countries where the needs basis 
for funding is represented.  I examined some formulas that have been used by other 
municipalities in funding homeland security grants.  Based on those approaches, I 
developed a model for the DHS to consider using in the Federal funding allocation 
process.  
I incorporate criticality, population density, threat, vulnerability and prevention 
into a formula that provides for significant improvement over per-capita approaches 
alone.  The formula uses the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (developed by Thomas 
Saaty in the early 1970’s), which has been used to solve complex problems in many areas 
of science and social science.  The AHP process makes it possible to apply a weighted 
approach for my proposed five criteria for a homeland security funding allocation.  I also 
specify ways to measure each of the criteria of the formula.  The need for the DHS to 
adopt a formula with measurable objectives is essential so funds can be delivered to the 
municipalities where the requirements are greatest, and also where the needs are not 




















I.  DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a critical role in building State and 
local capacity for homeland security (HS), through the distribution of grant funding to States 
and localities through the DHS’ Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP).  Currently, many of 
the funds distributed by the ODP are allocated either on a per-capita basis (i.e., according to the 
population in a State), or through the allocation to each State of an arbitrary .75 percent of the 
total available grant funding.   
Many policymakers believe that the country as a whole needs to build HS capacity and 
that the present formulas are the fairest way to allocate the limited resources of the Government.  
I disagree.  The funds should go to where they are needed, based on where terrorists are most 
likely to strike.  After two and a half years of funding cycles under the present formula grants, 
municipalities that are unlikely to be terrorist targets continue to get massive amount of funds.  
Money for homeland security is too scarce to be wasted, and needs to be allocated in a more 
sensible, threat-driven way. 
The importance of prevention reinforces the need to move toward a threat-driven 
approach.  The President of the United States has indicated in his National Strategy for 
Homeland Security that “prevention of terrorist attacks in the United States” is the first and 
highest priority in his strategic objectives for the Nation.1  Shouldn’t the funding allocation 
formula used by Department of Homeland Security also take into account the primacy of 
prevention, so that funds will be sent where – due to the threat – prevention requirements are 
most significant?   
The DHS is making important progress in that direction.  Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) directs that the DHS assistance for first responder 
preparedness will be based “on assessments of population concentrations, critical 
infrastructures, and other significant risk factors, particularly terrorism threats, to the extent 
permitted by law.”2  HSPD-8 also is a good start in mandating the development of a funding 
                                                 
1 National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 16, 2002, Page vii, retrieved March 27, 2004 from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.htmlNational Strategy for Homeland Security 
2 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, retrieved March 25, 2004 from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html  
2 
allocation formula that incorporates measurable criteria.  But much more needs to be done to 
restructure the overall allocation system for grant distributions by the DHS.  
In this thesis, I propose that the DHS adopt a new method of allocating grant funds, 
driven by criteria that include the criticality of potential targets within a jurisdiction, population 
density, threat, vulnerability and prevention priorities. This approach draws on the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) – a well recognized and widely used tool for decision-making – to 
weight and integrate the criteria into an effective funding allocation formula.  The resulting 
formula is vastly superior to the present arbitrary allotment of .75 percent of available grant 
funds to each State, and also better than the allocation of funding on a per capita basis.  It results 
in a formula that is much more likely to allocate funds where they are needed to defeat 
terrorism.  
 
A. CURRENT ALLOCATION FORMULA 
 
The allocation of homeland security grant funds on an arbitrary (as opposed to a need-
driven) basis rests in United States law.  The terms of that law are as follows: 
 
MINIMUM AMOUNT- Each State shall be allocated in each fiscal year under 
this section not less than 0.75 percent of the total amount appropriated in the 
fiscal year for grants pursuant to this section, except that the United States Virgin 
Islands, America Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands each shall be 
allocated 0.25 percent.3 
 
Grants awarded on a competitive basis also often have arbitrary constraints, even when 
they do take need-based criteria into account.  The assistance to Firefighter Grant Program that 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administered before being transferred to 
the ODP is based on a competitive grant process.  That competitive process is supposed to get 
funds where they are required.  However, the limiting factors imposed on municipalities are 
problematic.  The limit on the amount of money a department can apply for at present is 
                                                 
3  H. R. 3162 section 1014c, (Patriot Act), retrieved March 25, 2003 from 
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/20011025_hr3162_usa_patriot_bill.html 
3 
$750,000.4  To be fair, this system has not been designed as a needs system for terrorist 
prevention; it is based on a needs basis for fire response.  Sometimes, the two go hand in hand.  
Sometimes, they do not.  But the larger problem remains: by placing arbitrary limit on funds, 
rather than allocating funds strictly on the basis of requirements, there is a risk that funds will 
not go where they are most needed.   Allocating homeland security assistance on a per-capita 
basis suffers from the same basic flaw. 
There are some benefits to arbitrary and per-capita driven allocation systems, but the 
shortfalls far outweigh them.  Allocating funds by an arbitrary number or by population is 
simple.  Take the money appropriated, divide by the .75% and then by the population of each 
state and you have the amount that goes to each state.  You can invest 10 minutes and you have 
a funding allocation.  When you use these two formulas, you also have the tendency to remove 
the political process from the equation.  If the politicians are removed from the equation, so 
(perhaps) is political meddling. 
Efforts to build a needs-driven system may appear too difficult or too vulnerable to 
manipulation.  In a recent article by Martin Edwin Andersen and Alice Lipowicz, the authors 
note that objective criteria may be difficult to identify: “Is measuring the probability of a 
<terrorism> act a science, a matter of opinion, a guess — or politics?  Maybe it's all four, but it's 
also a lot more than a theoretical exercise for state and local governments maneuvering for 
federal anti-<terrorism> funds.5  
Arbitrary and per-capita based allocations may also reflect a desire to be “fair” to all 
States and local municipalities.  If funds are allocated on the basis of need, you may get an 
argument from one politician or another that his or her constituents didn’t get their fair share.  I 
argue that as a nation it is more important that we protect our most valuable and vulnerable 
assets and, by doing so, all citizens get their fair share.  The cost/benefit ratio of the nation will 
be managed better and the end product will be a country that is less vulnerable to the effects of 
terrorism. 
                                                 
4 AFGP Fire Prevention & Safety Grants About 2003 Fire Prevention and Safety Grants, retrieved May 31, 
2004 from http://www.usfa.fema.gov/fire-service/grants/safetygrant/03-prev-grants-about.shtm 
5 Martin Edwin Andersen and Alice Lipowicz, CQ Staff, “You Do the Math, Congress Says, Grappling With 
New Formulas for State and Local Grants,” CQ Homeland Security Website, Posted October  21, 2003, retrieved 
November 14, 2003  
4 
When the funds are distributed and some small town in a rural state gets funding to 
enhance the hazardous materials response of the fire department and the department purchases 
haz-mat equipment, can anyone tell me that expenditure best protects the country when there 
isn’t a possible target within a thousand miles?  Yet, what is the possibility of those same 
citizens visiting a large city and being involved in an incident?  Or, what is the economic cost to 
that same small town when the food supply of the nation is tampered with or Capitol Hill is 
closed due to a possible biological weapons attack?  Has anyone estimated the stock market’s 
impact on pension systems after 9/11 which affected every American?  The money has to be 
spent to protect the likely targets. 
 
B. SUPPORT FOR CHANGE 
 
Secretary Ridge has stated before Congress on a number of occasions that change is 
necessary in the DHS’ approach to allocating grant funds.  He notes that: 
the formula used in the past shouldn’t be used in the future because it doesn’t 
take into consideration some of the special needs that certain communities have 
and certain states have that are substantially greater than others.6 
 
One reason that change is so necessary is that resources for homeland security are limited, and 
therefore need to be allocated wisely.  A report by the Council on Foreign Relations,  
“Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared,” summarizes the 
problem we confront: 
If we knew that there was going to be a terrorist attack sometime in the next five 
years but did not know what type of attack it would be, who would carry it out, 
or where in the United States it would occur, what actions would we take to 
prepare and how would we allocate our human and financial resources to do so?7 
This is the true challenge that the nation has to face daily.  The United States certainly 
will experience another terrorist attack.  Will we be ready?  Will we be able to protect the 
citizens of this country the way they deserve to be protected?   Will we expend the funding in 
                                                 
6 Hernandez, Raymond, “New York Officials Complain of Unfair Share of Homeland Security Money,” New 
York Times, 30 March 2003. 
7 Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared, Report of an Independent Task 
Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2003, 1. 
5 
the correct areas?  All of us have to try to answer these questions with the fate of our country in 
mind.  The Council on Foreign Affairs estimated that “America will fall approximately $98.4 
billion short of meeting critical emergency responder needs during the next five years if current 
funding levels are maintained.”8  If this is true, we need to make sure that the available funds go 
to the areas of greatest need. 
The U.S. Conference of Mayors report, “90 Percent of Cities Left Empty-Handed 
Without Funds From Largest Federal Security Program,” puts the emphasis on getting direct 
funding to cities – as opposed to going through the convoluted process of passing the funds 
through the States.  Gary, Indiana, Mayor Scott King states: 
Not only are we last in line for funding, we are the last in line to be consulted 
about what it takes to protect our citizens….Cities know their needs best.  State 
bureaucrats are in no position to decide whether or what kind of protective suits 
or communications equipment we need for homeland security.9 
Will the legislators listen or will it be politics as usual?  Will the politicians actually put 
the money where it is needed, where the vulnerabilities are?  Will the money go to where the 
critical infrastructure is located?  Will the funds go where the population density is such that it 
continues to attract attacks from the terrorists?   Should cities need to go through the State to get 
its funds?  There are cities that do not need their money running through the State to apply it 
correctly.  If so, why does the Federal Government make the requirement of State passage 
mandatory?  If the critical infrastructure is located in a city where there is a threat, there is no 
need for the State to get involved unless the State decides to protect that critical infrastructure. 
My congratulations go to the Government Accounting Office (GAO) for picking up on 
much of what was discussed in the report conducted by the Council on Foreign Affairs, but also 
for adding a key new item for change: the ability to have measurable performance goals must be 
incorporated into the funding formula and reported to Congress as a need.  “Reforming Federal 
Grants to Better Meet Outstanding Needs,” GAO-03-1146T states the following:  
We noted at the time that the national strategy’s initiatives often did not provide 
a baseline set of performance goals and measures for homeland security.16 Then 
and now—over a year later—the nation does not have a comprehensive set of                                                  
8 Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared, Report of an Independent Task 
Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations,  June 2003, 2. 
9 The United States Conference of Mayors “U.S. Conference of Mayors Announces: 90 Percent of Cities Left 
Empty-Handed Without Funds From Largest Federal Security Program” September 17, 2003 
http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/press_releases/documents/homelandfunding_091703.pdf 
6 
performance goals and measures against which to assess and upon which to 
improve prevention efforts, vulnerability reduction, and responsiveness to 
damage and recovery needs at all levels of government.10 
Both Republicans and Democrats alike want to make changes to the current system.    In 
two bills recently introduced to Congress, we see the chance for bipartisan politics merging in 
response to this nagging question of how the money should be spent.  
House Republicans and Democrats on the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security are talking about collaborating on legislation meant to streamline the 
homeland security funding process for first responders.  A committee 
spokeswoman declined to say whether two separate bills -- introduced by Rep. 
Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), who chairs the committee, and ranking minority 
member Rep. Jim Turner (D-Texas) -- would be merged.11 
These are not the only politicians who have introduced legislation to try to fix this 
distribution problem.  Senator Clinton (D-NY) also has introduced legislation so that funds 
would go directly to first responders in middle and large communities.  This is a good start in 
putting the money where the population density warrants it, but once again, it doesn’t take into 
consideration the threat to and the vulnerability of the community.12  Without threat and 
vulnerability analysis, the money could be going to the wrong places.  Shouldn’t communities 
with threat-driven prevention programs be afforded some additional funds?   
Key legislators are also beginning to insist that as the DHS distributes funds, States and 
localities be held accountable for spending it wisely.  The following statement shows how the 
frustration of the country has finally boiled over into Congress.  Rep. Hal Rogers (R-Ky), 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee on Homeland Security, recently demanded 
that the ODP immediately issue a plan that specifies to States and local first responders the 
"minimum essential capabilities" that the Federal Government expects from them when grants 
are awarded.13 
                                                 
10 GAO report 03-1146T taken from website http://www.gao.gov  November 15, 2003. 
11 Sarkar, Dibya, “DHS grants bill could be bipartisan,” FCW.COM, posted November 4, 2003, retrieved 
November 14, 2003.  
12 Press release by Senator Clinton taken from the web site http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document.  
retrieved on September 27, 2003. 
13 Strohm, Chris, Lawmakers demand standards for homeland security grants, retrieved March 21, 2004 from 
http://govexec.com/dailyfed/0304/031804c1.htm 
7 
Of course, politicians can be part of the problem.  Legislators sometimes attempt to 
direct Federal resources in ways that help them get reelected, but may not meet genuine national 
needs.  Congress recently denied a $261 million request for NYPD counterterrorism training 
and equipment, along with $277 million denied to the FDNY in the same areas of preparedness.  
Simultaneously, Congress approved in the $397.4 billion Omnibus Appropriations Bill 
$202,500 for the Nation’s Cherry Festival, $560,000 for a Montana sheep study, $500,000 for 
improved catfish health and, to top it off, $90,000 on the National Cowgirl Hall of Fame.14  
Politicians and government employees see that there is a need to spend the money correctly so 
that the country is protected from the effects of terrorism.  As American citizens we all need to 
band together to ensure that our elected officials and government employees spend our precious 
money in the correct manner. 
Given the temptations of “pork,” and the risk that the allocation of funds can be 
politicized, the present formula grants approach to distributing grants have a certain appeal.  
They are difficult to tamper with.  Need-driven criteria may be more difficult to develop and 
apply.  But the war against terrorism is too serious to continue to take the easy way out.  As 
noted by Paul Posner, General Accounting Office's Managing Director of Federal Budget Issues 
and Intergovernmental Relations, the bottom line question is:  “What impact will the grant 
system have in protecting the nation against terrorism?”15  The Department of Homeland 
Security is in its infancy and represents the largest and most comprehensive reorganization of 
the Federal Government in more than 50 years.  Are we not going to demand that all of this 
reorganization do some good?  We have to ensure that these most vital funds are going to attack 
the problem.  By allocating these funds under the existing procedures, there is no way to ensure 
that the monies are attacking the problem in the most effective way.  Chapter II examines 
“lessons learned” from other grant mechanisms that might be applied to the challenges of 
improving the DHS system.  
                                                 
14 Feiden, Douglas, “Congress Loves Pork Finest and Bravest Lose out to Hogs,” New York Daily News, 23 
March 2003. 
15 Sarkar, Dibya, “DHS doles out $2.2 billion in grants, FCW.COM, posted November 4, 2003, retrieved 
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II. FUNDING FORMULAS 
 
A. COMPARISON OF GRANTS 
 
Many of the departments, offices and bureaus that make up the Federal Government 
have served as the administrators for grants to States and local municipalities across a wide 
range of programs.  Other democracies have also pioneered new approaches to grant allocation.  
At least some of these grants are allocated on the basis of need, and therefore provide models 
that might be adapted to serve the special requirements of homeland security.  This Chapter 
analyzes the alternative approaches to funding distribution reflected in these models.  The 
Chapter also reviews recent initiatives by the DHS that relate to the funding allocation process, 
and examines the implications for opportunities to develop a better allocation system.   
 
B. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF FUNDING 
 
In doing my research, I have found that the funding for domestic preparedness is not the 
only program where distribution of funds has been contentious.  This problem does not appear 
to be unique to the United States.  Other funding systems across a range of governmental 
functions -- from health care to housing grants -- are under scrutiny as well, and a number of 
new approaches to need-driven funding allocations have emerged.  
 
1. Health Care Funding Formula 
In a report published by the British Columbia Medical Association, titled “Regional 
Health Care Funding Formula,” some of the same problems that I have shown in the ODP 
formula also exist.  In a survey to which more than 900 physicians responded, “less than 1% of 
physicians are interested in capitation as a payment modality.”16  In addition to the British 
Columbia Medical Association delineating the problem, the Minister of Health received a letter 
in 1999 from the Health Association of British Columbia, stating “that the implementation of an 
                                                 
16 British Columbia Medical Association web site (January 2002), Regional Health Care Funding Formula 
retrieved, February 27, 2003.from  
http://www.bcma.org/IssuesPolicy/IssueBackgrounders/regionalfundingformula.asp 
10 
equitable, population needs-based funding formula is a top priority, and that the lack of a 
population needs-based funding formula is directly impacting the effective delivery of health 
services to the people of British Columbia.”17    
The report continues and proposes the following formula that is based not only on 
population, but also on age, gender and socio-economic status, all of which reflect on the 
proportion of funding that is needed to have a fair and robust system. This proposal was 
successfully adopted in the 2002/2003 fiscal year.  The implication for homeland security 
funding is that there can be need-based criteria related to population, and my proposal will 
explore that possibility (especially in regards to the population density of a municipality). 
 
2. Housing and Urban Development Funding Formulas 
The Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) of the U.S Federal 
Government is in charge of administering a number of grant programs.  As far as I have 
determined, all of their programs are based, at least partially, on needs.  I will review a number 
of them and show how they distribute funds by meeting certain needs-based criteria.  It would 
be easy for them to just use the per capita formula that the Office of Domestic Preparedness 
uses, but they do not.  They actually developed a system that appears to deliver the funds where 
they are most needed.  Not only did they develop a needs-based system, but it varies for the 
different grants they offer.  It may be because they have been administering these grants for a 
number of years and have had the time to develop these much-needed systems.   
The first program I will discuss dealing with HUD financing is the state-administered 
Community Development Block Grants (CDBG).  This program gives states the flexibility to 
administer the grant to its needs.  The states must assure the following.  
• Formulate community-developed objectives. 
• Decide how to distribute the funds among communities in non-entitlement areas. 
• Ensure the recipient communities comply with applicable State and Federal laws 
and requirements.18 
                                                 
17 Health Association of British Columbia. (1999, February). Population/Needs-based Funding Formula 
Letter. retrieved February 27, 2003 from http://www.ha.bc.ca/info/item.cfm/policywork/Fundingformulaletter 
18 Dept. of Housing and Urban Development web site State Administered CDBG retrieved March 2, 2003, 
http://www.hud.gov/fdalloc.cfm 
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HUD determines the amount of each grant by a formula that uses several objective 
measures of community needs, including the extent of poverty, population, housing 
overcrowding, age of housing and population growth lag in relationship to other metropolitan 
areas.19 
The next program that I reviewed is the Comprehensive Grant Program (CGP).  This 
program “makes funds available to help public housing agencies correct physical and 
management deficiencies and keep units in the housing stock safe and desirable places to live. 
The CGP gives large Public Housing Authorities (PHA) discretion for planning specific 
improvements and facilitates long-term planning by providing funds annually on a formula 
basis.”20  In this program, the municipality must have a public housing agency, which is not 
unlike having an asset that might be targeted by terrorists.   
The third program of interest under the HUD grant program is titled Housing 
Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA).  Under this program, there are funds available 
to deal with housing issues for people with AIDS, and families with members who have AIDS.  
Again, the department has given the municipalities some flexibility in assigning the monies to 
address the task.  “These include, but are not limited to, the acquisition, rehabilitation, or new 
construction of housing units; costs for facility operations; rental assistance; and short-term 
payments to prevent homelessness.  HOPWA funds also may be used for health care and mental 
health services, chemical dependency treatment, nutritional services, case management, 
assistance with daily living, and other supportive services.”21   
These grants by Housing and Urban Development have one thing in common.  They are 
predominately based on need.  Could you imagine monies for AIDS families dispensed per 
capita?  There are some states with a population with very few families experiencing the ravage 
caused by the deadly virus.  How about spending money for housing designed for a municipal 
housing complex, only to find out that the city didn’t have any AIDS victims.  HUD would take 
                                                 
19 U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development web site State Administered CDBG retrieved March 2, 
2003, http://www.hud.gov/fdalloc.cfm 
20 U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development web site Comprehensive Grant Program (CGP) retrieved 
March 1, 2003 from http://www.hud.gov/fdalloc.cfm 
21 U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development web site State Administered CDBG retrieved March 2, 
2003 from http://www.hud.gov/fdalloc.cfm 
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a beating if they provided grants solely on a per capita basis.  They have tried to do their job and 
at least allocate the funds to areas where the money is needed. 
3. Iowa Homeland Security Funds Distribution Formula  
Another instructive example is the way that Iowa distributes homeland security funding 
to local jurisdictions.  Iowa doesn’t take the easy route.  They established a number of 
categories that were taken into account to meet the important criteria for Iowa.  They included 
critical assets, people (population) and agriculture infrastructure.  In developing priorities, it 
was established that the majority of assets were concentrated in fewer than one-third of Iowa’s 
counties.22  The population centers became the focus for counter bio-terrorism strategies and 
agriculture was identified as a universal critical asset for all Iowa counties.  The value of the 
critical asset was defined as the numerical criticality score derived from a mathematical 
formula measuring asset criticality and vulnerability used in the state’s Critical Asset Protection 
Plan.23 
The following is an account of how the formula was developed.  Under Iowa’s Critical 




They further divided criticality into eight sub-groupings.  The sub-groups are: 
• Mass causality 
• Essential emergency response 
• Economics 
• Key military facilities 
• Critical infrastructure role (mostly transportation assets) 
• Input to the government 
                                                 
 22 Gordan, Ellen, The Iowa Homeland Security Initiative, 2002 Federal Homeland Security Funds Distribution 
Formula.  
 23 Gordan, Ellen, The Iowa Homeland Security Initiative, 2002 Federal Homeland Security Funds Distribution 
Formula. 
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• Symbolic targets 
• Information technology of an asset.   
 
Under the Vulnerability area of the formula the following five subgroups were utilized: 
• Visibility 
• Access 
• Cyber access 
• Site specific hazards 
• Collateral damage potential 
Under the critical asset area of the formula Iowa also included threat as a factor.  They 
knew that this was an important factor but were unable to come up with sub-groups that could 
be measured objectively.  At the time of using this formula threat was factored in as a constant 
across all counties.  They continue to strive to develop this area.  As I address this area in my 
formula I concluded that the DHS needs to be involved with States and localities to help them 
develop and apply this criterion.  It is beyond the scope of a local municipality, since they do 
not have all the information necessary to develop measurable factors. 
All of the subgroups were evaluated by severity and scope.  They were given two 
numerical values between 1 to 5.  The final score was the product of the severity and scope for a 
maximum value of 25.  Then each score was converted into a percentage.  By representing the 
numerical scores as a percentage, you remove much of the artificial weighting produced by 
using eight sub-groups under critical assets and five sub-groups under vulnerability and a 
constant under threat.24  I have normalized the values to 1 in my formula to take this same effect 
into account. 
The population portion of the formula was simply the number of people living in a 
county divided by the number of people living in the state.  Once again this was represented in a 
percentage.  This goes a long way in addressing the premise that terrorists want to go after 
population centers.  In my formula I go one step further and factor in population by density.   
                                                 
24 Telephone conversation between author and AJ Mumm chief planner, Iowa Department of Public Defense 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division and the author, May 13, 2004. 
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The Agro-Terrorism portion of the formula was derived from the total market value for 
each county divided by the total market value for the State.  Once again this was expressed in a 
percentage.   
The three percentages were then added together divided by three to come up with the 
Funding Formula Factor for each county.  This factor was then applied to total funds available 
to the counties to determine the amount of funds disbursed to each county.25 
Iowa needs to be commended on recognizing the necessity for developing a needs-based 
formula for the distribution of funds to the counties.  They certainly were ahead of the rest of 
the country as well as the Federal Government in identifying the need to develop a needs based 
approach that can be measured. 
 
4. New York State Homeland Security Funding Formulas 
New York State has also recognized that funding for municipalities should be needs 
driven.  New York State has based the 04 State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and the 04 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) on Population Density, Critical 
Infrastructure and Sites of Targets.  As of the date of this thesis they have not released the 
formula behind the allocations of funds.   
 
5. Nunn-Lugar Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program 
The country started training and equipping first responders by passing the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1996.26  This act launched the Nunn-Lugar Domenici Domestic 
Preparedness Program.  Under this program, 120 cities would be funded to increase their ability 
to mitigate a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack in their community.  As early as 
1998, in testimony before Congress, the GAO was critical about the selection of cities, as well 
as noting that nothing was incorporated into the formula regarding threat, risk and vulnerability. 
There was also no analysis to evaluate the extent to which the cities selected for 
the program were at risk of a terrorist attack warranting an increased level of 
preparedness, or whether a smaller city with high risk factors might have been 
                                                 
25 Gordan, Ellen, The Iowa Homeland Security Initiative, 2002 Federal Homeland Security Funds Distribution 
Formula.  
26 National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 1996, retrieved January 7, 2004 from 
http://www.fas.org/starwars/congress/1995_r/h104406.htm 
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excluded from the program due to its lower population. In fact, in none of the 
seven cities we visited did the FBI determine there was a credible threat of a 
WMD attack, which would be one factor considered in a threat and risk 
assessment.  In our April 1998 report, we cited several public and private sector 
entities that use or recommend threat and risk assessment processes to establish 
requirements and target investments for reducing risk.27 
I applaud the work of these three distinguished members of the Congress for their 
insight and work in the early stages of the preparation of the country’s first responders, 
especially how they tried to get equipment directly to the first responders.  The thought of going 
directly to cities has merit, but only when linked to a threat perspective.  As we look at the 
history of the transfer of the majority of the grants from the ODP, first in the DOJ and now in 
the DHS, there is still no mention of threat, risk or vulnerability in any of the funding formulas.  
This has to change.   
 
6. Urban Areas Security Initiative 
In the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) of 2003, the government attempted to 
deliver funding to the correct areas.  Funding went to the seven areas that, for the most part, 
constituted the most likely targets.  “This financial assistance is being provided to address the 
unique equipment, training, planning and exercise needs of large, high-threat urban areas…”28 
CITY NAME     TOTAL 
New York City    $24,768,000 
National Capital Region   $18,081,000 
Los Angeles     $12,422,000 
Seattle     $11,201,000 
Chicago     $10,896,000 
San Francisco    $10,349,000 
Houston     $ 8,634,00029 
Table 1. Funding for UASI 2003 
                                                 
27 GAO report COMBATING TERRORISM: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic 
Preparedness Program, retrieved January 10, 2004 from http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99016t.pdf  
28 ’03 Urban Areas Security Initiative 1 retrieved January 10, 2004 from 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy03uasigrant.txt 




Certainly, New York and the National Capital Region experienced terrorism firsthand.  
Los Angeles, along with the above-mentioned two cities, also has experienced threats.  The 
UASI funding formula used the following criteria: 
Funding for this program was determined by formula using a combination of 
current threat estimates, critical assets within the urban area, and population 
density.  The formula is a weighted linear combination of each factor, the result 
of which is ranked and used to calculate the proportional allocation of 
resources.30 
We finally see the words threat estimates, critical assets and population density as part 
of the formula, and the Federal Government must be applauded for finally recognizing that need 
should be included in the process.  The Nation still has to move forward to develop a formula 
for the entire country that takes need into account.  I will include a number of the above criteria, 
as well as introduce a prevention element in my formula, to do just that.  
You would think that the Federal Government would continue to fund the areas above 
by either the same or similar formula in future rounds, but somehow that changed in the UASI 
II of fiscal year 03, with 41 cities or counties being funded.31  In the fiscal year 04, the UASI 
grant raises the urban areas to 50.   These grants, like UASI 03, mention “high-threat, high-
density, urban areas.”32  They just do not seem to follow the same criteria at UASI 03.  The 
government goes from seven areas to 50 in a year’s time.  Why?  Was there more information 
on threat, need or was it something else--like politics--that led to the increase of urban areas 
from seven to 50?  Mention of threat estimates, critical assets and population density is absent 
in UASI 04.  Why? This is one formula that the government almost got right. 
Another troubling criterion put into the USAI 03 II and the USAI 04 is the requirement 
that funding requests go through the states.  The states are required to pass at least 80 percent of 
the money to the named municipalities, but the 20 percent they can keep has once again nothing 
                                                 
30 ‘03 Urban Areas Security Initiative 1 retrieved January 10, 2004 from 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy03uasigrant.txt 
31 ‘03 Urban Areas Security Initiative 2 retrieved January 10, 2004 from 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/UASIIIFY03GrantAppFinal.txt 
32 Fiscal Year 2004 Urban Areas Security Initiative Grant Program: Program Guidelines and Application Kit, 
retrieved January 10, 2004 from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/docs/fy04uasi.pdf  
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to do with threat, risk vulnerability, prevention or, for that matter, anything else.  Once again, 
the question has to be asked, why?  
C. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE8 
 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (issued December 2003) is considered by 
many to be the ultimate fix for moving forward against the threats of terrorism.  The directive 
has strong wording in the preparedness realm of homeland security: 
(1) This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States 
to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, 
establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to 
State and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness 
capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities.33  
I agree that there are many aspects of this Directive where the administration is correct.  
Among the excellent features of the directive are: 
• Mandatory setting of timelines with regard to making the Secretary of 
Homeland Security establish and deliver to the President a National 
preparedness goal by the DHS FY 2006 budget submission.34  
• The coordinated interagency grant process.35  
• The adoption and approval of State strategies by September 200536  
• The mandate of having the Federal Government incorporate other factors into 
establishing a formula that is actually worth the paper it is written on, as 
specified in Section 10 as follows:  
(10) In making allocations of Federal preparedness assistance to the States, the 
Secretary, the Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Transportation, 
the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments and 
agencies that provide assistance for first responder preparedness will base those 
allocations on assessments of population concentrations, critical infrastructures, and 
                                                 
33 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, December 17, 2003, page 1 
34 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, December 17, 2003, page 2 
35 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, December 17, 2003, page 2 
36 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, December 17, 2003, page 3 
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other significant risk factors, particularly terrorism threats, to the extent permitted by 
law. 37 
My problem with this Directive is it does not go far enough.  It does not sufficiently take 
into account the need to have prevention programs as one of the criteria to obtain funds.  It does 
not take into account activities that actually work in a quantifiable way to be a pre-requisite to 
receive funds.  My formula takes this into account and deals with the preliminary aspects of 
quantifying the prevention approach.   
The Directive also offers a very narrow definition of prevention.  The definition is as 
follows: 
 (i) The term "prevention" refers to activities undertaken by the first responder 
community during the early stages of an incident to reduce the likelihood or 
consequences of threatened or actual terrorist attacks. More general and broader 
efforts to deter, disrupt, or thwart terrorism are not addressed in this directive.38  
 
There certainly are aspects of response that make the reduction of secondary and tertiary 
affects of terrorist events important criteria in the objectives that an Incident Commander 
mandates in the establishment of the Incident Action Plan (IAP).  The reduction of the effects of 
a terrorist event as well as accidental or naturally occurring incidents is sound thinking.  It also 
follows the National Incident Management System NIMS protocols.  Nevertheless, It is 
ludicrous to think this is where prevention starts.  Prevention starts in planning for the all 
hazards approach long before an event happens.  Given the importance of preventing any 
terrorist event from ever occurring, all jurisdictions must treat prevention as a top priority.  This 
thought is also in keeping with the first objective of the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  “Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;”39 
I also take exception to the use of the word prevent or prevention that is used 12 times in 
this three and a half page document, many times with a connotation that is more than just after a 
terrorism event has occurred.  If it was the Administration’s position only to use the prevention 
aspect in this document in the after-attack perspective, the President may need to issue another 
directive that deals with first responders in pre-event prevention guidelines 
                                                 
37 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, December 17, 2003, page 3. 
38 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, December 17, 2003, page 2. 
39National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 16, 2002, Page vii, retrieved March 27, 2004 from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html 
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Most important, however, even if the correct prevention criteria were adequately 
specified by HSPSD-8 and related documents, the DHS still lacks a systematic way of 
integrating and weighting those criteria into an overall funding allocation process. The next 
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III. PROPOSED FORMULA 
A. INTRODUCTION OF THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP) 
 
Until now the Federal Government has arbitrarily put values on the  criteria used in 
funding allocation formula.  The proper weighting of the values to each criterion to be used in 
allocating funding is an important challenge.  The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) provides 
an excellent approach to this problem.  Developed at the Wharton School of Business by 
Thomas Saaty, the AHP allows decision makers to model a complex problem in a hierarchical 
structure showing the relationships of the goal, objectives (criteria), sub-objectives, and 
alternatives (See Figure 1). Uncertainties and other influencing factors can also be included.40 
The AHP has been applied to a wide array of specific issues.  In his 1980 book The 
Analytic Hierarchy Process, Saaty attributes the origins of this process to his effort in 1971 to 
develop contingency planning for the Department of Defense.  Other areas he studied in the 
following years include the 1972 work on the economic, political and military status within 
Egypt during Middle East unrest and the “No Peace, No War” concept as well as the Sudan 
Transport Study in 1973.41  As the process matured, others took hold of the concept and 
continued the work in different areas.  Dr. Robert Kupperman worked for the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, in analysis of terrorism, while others worked in the conflict in Northern 
Ireland.42  This process continued to be accepted as depicted in 1990 when the European 
Journal of Operational Research published a special issue consisting of 18 articles dealing with 
applications of AHP to different segments of science and business.  A few of the titles of the 
articles are: 
• Equitable allocation of livers for orthotopic transplantation. 
• A decision aid in the public debate on nuclear power. 
                                                 
40 Saaty, Thomas., The Analytic Hierarchy Process, New York, N.Y., McGraw Hill, 1980, Publications, 
Pittsburgh, 1996. page 4. 
41 Saaty, Thomas, The Analytic Hierarchy Process, New York, N.Y., McGraw Hill, 1980, Publications, 
Pittsburgh, 1996, ix.  
42 Saaty, Thomas, The Analytic Hierarchy Process, New York, N.Y., McGraw Hill, 1980, Publications, 
Pittsburgh, 1996, ix.  
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• An industrial bond rating model based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process43 
 
The AHP provides decision makers with a system to assign the proper values to criteria 
within a given decision-making formula. 
Sub Objective Sub Objective
Objective
Sub Objective Sub Objective
Objective




Figure 1.   Hierarchy 
 
As shown above, you take the complex problem and decompose it into criteria that can 
be measured, by using objectives and sub-objectives until criteria can be measured.  The 
Analytic Hierarchy Process can be applied to many of the complex problems that are being 
faced within the Department of Homeland Security at present.  I will use a simple example to 
illustrate how this process can work as well in showing some of the beginning steps in applying 
it to the complex funding formula.   
 
1. Example of the Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Let’s say we wanted to purchase a vehicle.  There are a lot of criteria that could be used 
to compare different choices.  For our example, we will limit the criteria to price, color, and 
performance.  Although we have three criteria, we will compare two at a time.  We first set up 
the process to see if one criterion is more worthy than the others.  This will develop into a 
process where the different criteria will be weighted.  The following table is the criteria that are 
used to develop the weighted averages while using the Analytic Hierarchy Process.  It is based 
on the premise that it is relatively easy to compare two different criteria.  You use the pairwise 
comparisons that enable you to make the entire process simpler. 
                                                 
43 Srinivasan, V. and Bolster, P.J. An industrial bond rating model based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process 
European Journal of Operational Research Volume 48, Number 1, September 5, 1990.  
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Verbal scale Numerical values 
Equally important, likely or preferred 1 
Moderately more important, likely or preferred 3 
Strongly more important, likely or preferred 5 
Very strongly more important, likely or preferred 7 
Extremely more important, likely or preferred 9 
Intermediate values to reflect compromise 2, 4, 6, 8 
Table 2. Fundamental scale for pairwise comparisons 
 
The pairwise comparison using the criteria above in the previously mentioned example 
would look like this: 
 
 Color Price Performance 
Color 1 1/7 1/9 
Price 7 1 1/5 
Performance 9 5 1 
Table 3. Weighting Criteria to Purchase a Vehicle 
 
The first step is to compare each criterion to itself, i.e., color to color, price to price and 
performance to performance.  The scores would all be one, meaning they are equally important, 
likely or preferred since you are comparing them to themselves.  Thus the diagonal values are 
all ones. In this example the first column compares color to price and performance.  The 7 
indicates that price is very strongly more important, likely or preferred to color, and the 9 
indicates that performance is extremely more important, likely or preferred to color.  The next 
step is to place the reciprocal values in the row across from color.  The color is very strongly 
less important, likely or preferred to price and, extremely less important, likely or preferred to 
24 
performance.  The only criteria without values are a comparison of performance and price.  If 
we believe that performance is strongly more important, likely or preferred than the price, we 
put a 5 at the intersection of performance and price and a 1/5 at the intersection of price and 
performance. 
The next step is to normalize the weights to a 0 to 1 scale by adding up the columns and 
dividing the values by the total of the column.  We then choose any of the columns and use the 
values in that column to weight the relative importance of the criteria.  Shown in table 4 and 5. 
 
 Color Price Performance 
Color 1 1/7 1/9 
Price 7 1 1/5 
Performance 9 5 1 
Total 17 43/7 59/45 
Table 4. Normalizing the Values 
 
 Color Price Performance Weighted Ave 
Color 1/17 1/43 5/59 .15 
Price 7/17 7/43 9/59 .24 
Performance 9/17 35/43 45/59 .62 
Total 1 1 1 1.01 
Table 5. Normalized Weights 
To make this difficult process somewhat easier there is a computer program that was 
developed called “Expert Choice” to assist in much of the math involved in the process.  Booz, 
Allen Hamilton’s International Infrastructure Team, compared results from subject matter 
experts with mathematical equations, and confirmed that this computer process is reliable.44 
                                                 
44 Booz Allen Hamilton Infrastructure Team, Reproducing Calculations for the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
retrieved March 14, 2004 from http://mdm.gwu.edu/Forman/Reproducing%20AHP%20calculations.pdf  
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2. Applying the Analytical Hierarchy Process to First Responder Funding 
In this application of the Analytic Hierarchy Process the goal would be to provide the 
necessary funds to first responders to “continue to provide planning, equipment, training, 
exercise, and management and administrative funding to emergency prevention, preparedness, 
and response personnel”45 as per the wording in the 2004 Homeland Security Grant Program. 
The objectives (measurable) would be to: 
• Identify what constitutes critical infrastructure 
• Identify and fund areas where if a terrorist attack occurs will cause the greatest 
casualties 
• Identify and fund areas where the greatest threats are 
• Identify and fund areas where the vulnerabilities are highest 











Figure 2.   Funding Formula for First Responder Matrix 
 
Some of the objectives have sub-objectives and they are laid out in each of the sections 
on the individual criteria below.  Remember with AHP we need to continue down the levels in 






                                                 




Before the nation can decide where funding for first responders should go, they need to 
decide what is critical. How can the criticality of potential targets in a jurisdiction best be 
assessed and taken into account for grant allocation purposes?  There appears to be an 
overwhelming sense that the entire infrastructure in each and every city and state is critical to 
that municipality.  In a limited form, this is a correct statement but, in most cases, the 
municipality exaggerates that criticality.  Also, what may be critical to a State or city may not 
be critical to the Nation.  Once the Nation uses common criteria to access criticality, then the 
Federal Government can say what they will and will not protect.   
If the Federal Government passes money to a State to protect the top 10 critical assets, 
by national standards, and the State feels that they have 20, the State then will need to decide 
how to protect the rest.  If a priority is in a city, the State may elect to pass that money to the 
city for them to protect it.  The same example presented for the State exists for the cities.  If the 
city gets the money through the State or directly from the Federal Government, they need to 
provide protection for that priority.  If they choose to provide additional or more comprehensive 
protection for priorities that are not recognized as national or State priorities, they can do so at 
their expense.   
In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the administration announced 13 sectors 
that are critical to the survivability of the nation.  They are agriculture, food, water, public 
health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and 
telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry, postal and 
shipping. 46  The administration also has noted that some other key assets need to be included in 
the mix as well, as we can see by the following quote. 
In addition to our critical infrastructure, our country must also protect a number 
of key assets—individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital 
systems, but could create local disaster or profoundly damage our Nation’s 
                                                 
46 National Strategy for Homeland Security, pg. 30, retrieved on January 18, 2004, from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf 
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morale or confidence. Key assets include symbols or historical attractions, such 
as prominent national, state, or local monuments and icons.47 
When we add monuments and icons to the list of critical infrastructure, we have 14 
sectors with which to deal.  
The members of the Center of Infrastructure Expertise took these 14 sectors and 
developed a computer program that attempts to streamline the process of determining the 
criticality of a facility.  Their analytical process is based on the criticality, accessability, 
recoverability, vulnerability, espyability, and redundancy (CARVER) of an entity.48  
The technology that CARVER was based on was transferred to the private sector and 
developed into another tool called CARVER2. 49  This tool allows municipalities to rank their 
own critical infrastructure and merge it into State and national data bases to allow the country to 
better assess what is critical.  We will not be able to have a national data base of critical 
infrastructure until the entire nation uses the same analysis tool.  This tool goes a long way in 
preparing the country to use a common set of criteria.  With that said there are some problems 
with this model.  One of the problems is that all of the criteria is weighted the same.  This 
means that all of the components are equal.  I do not think you will get everyone to agree what 
the measures are, but certainly everyone will say they are not all equal.  Further work in this 
area has to be accomplished. 
The tool mentions interdependency but doesn’t incorporate a numerical value in the 
formula to account for that.  Once again more work in this area needs to be done. 
Albert Laszlo Barabasi has been credited with discovering that many naturally occurring 
networks are linked together by hubs.  In many of these networks the hubs are not formed at 
random like most things in nature, but by a scale-free network.  In a scale-free network there are 
some hubs that are more important than other hubs.  The more important hubs are linked to 
many other hubs.  Professor Ted G. Lewis of the Navel Postgraduate School in Monterey 
California is applying this phenomenon to critical infrastructure CI sectors.  He has discovered 
                                                 
47 National Strategy for Homeland Security, pg. 30, retrieved on January 18, 2004, from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf  
48 NI2 Center for Infrastructure Expertise Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset Analysis Software. 
49 National Infrastructure Institute Center for Infrastructure Expertise website, retrieved on January 18, 2004, 
from http://www.ni2cie.org/people.html 
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that many of the critical infrastructure sectors fall under this scale-free system.  By associating 
this scale-free process to CI it shows that there are some pieces of CI that are more critical.   
This creates a third problem with the CARVER2 model.   
Figure 3 depicts how the power/energy sector is interconnected with the other sectors of 
critical infrastructure.  If a terrorist attack is perpetrated against the power/energy sector it is 
obvious that a greater overall effect could certainly be part of the problem.  This is especially 
true when the result of the attack makes the repair of the problem difficult.  If the time that the 
power/energy sector is down is extensive the effectiveness of the attack is greater.  The 
power/energy sector needs to factor in a quick repair and turnaround time.  Spare parts should 
be common and available on a moments notice.  But that is a topic for some one else to figure 
out.  I bring it up here because CARVER2 does not take this interdependency into account.  In 
the final formula there has to be a interdependency section. 
Also the AHP can be used by all sectors to analyze the difficult choices presented to 
them in figuring out the policies of how to cope with an attack on each and every sector.  Where 
to place resources is certainly a question that comes to mind?  Where to spend money on buying 
or leasing equipment are always options that need to be decided?  The possibility of joining 




Figure 3.   Hierarchy of Critical Infrastructure Power/Energy50 
 
Until a better matrix is developed, it will remain necessary to the necessity to use either 
CARVER2 or some equivalent assessment tool.  We cannot continue to throw money at a 
problem and hope that it is going to the correct places, especially when we can use a formula 
and reduce the amount of money spent and obtain a better result. 
In order to develop a measured quantity for critical infrastructure I propose the 
following hierarchical structure.  In doing so you can assign weights and measurements across 
the Nation that conform to identify truly critical infrastructure.   
                                                 
50 Lewis, Ted naval Postgraduate School Critical Infrastructure CS 3660 class: Website on Vulnerability 


















Figure 4.   Criticality Hierarchy 
 
C. POPULATION DENSITY 
 
In Chapter I, I strongly attacked the use of population as a criterion for allocating grants.  
You may wonder why I am including it here.  When I began on this project, I thought the 
population should not play a roll at all in the grant process, and then I realized that that is a key 
criterion in the mind of the enemy.  The new terrorists want to kill as many people as possible.  
In order for terrorists to kill many people with the limited resources they have, they must 
maximize each and every attack.  To accomplish this, they need to attack the areas of the 
country where the population is concentrated.  Where else does this occur but in the big cities?  
As I have stated before, this has been recognized, first with allocations in the Nunn-Lugar 
Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program and then again with the Urban Areas Security 
Initiative (UASI).  My proposal brings the population factor into the formula, combined with a 
density factor.  Thus both a large and a concentrated population criteria are taken into account.  
In order to develop a measured quantity for population density I propose the following 
hierarchical structure.  In doing so you can assign weights and measurement across the Nation 
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Figure 5.   Population Density Hierarchy 
 
I would propose that the ODP formulates a number of attack scenarios, and then have all 
entities that are applying for the grants run the scenarios in their communities (similar to the 
process in the latest UASI grant, where cities took the worst case scenario and assigned specific 
fatalities to each of the specific areas in question).  My suggestion is to take three different 
attacks scenarios and average the results.  As long as all grant requests use the same scenarios 
the results will correlate.   The following are three proposed attacks that would certainly tax the 
first responder community. 
• A 1 Kiloton nuclear device that has been detonated.    
• A biological attack consisting of 1 pound of military grade anthrax. 
• 2 gallons of VX sprayed over a square mile.   
The weather in each of the events would have to be the same.  The instructions would 
include the placing of the event in an area that would cause the most damage to the community.  
Each of these scenarios has the ability to be modeled to allow for a fair assessment of the 
community involved. 
The Census Bureau has a multitude of population data on the country, data that pinpoint 
where people live.  Even so, I have been unable to find a table that covers what I propose.  









Source:  US Census Bureau 
Released:  March 12, 1996 
Revised:  June 26, 2000 (Corrected population number for Alaska) 
 
Pop. Sq.Ki. Sq.Mi Sq.Ki. Sq.Mi Name 
29760021 403970.7 155973.2 73.7 190.8 California 
279182 1910.1 737.5 669.7 1734.5 Alameda County 
1113 1913.1 738.7 0.6 1.5 Alpine County 
30039 1534.7 592.6 19.6 50.7 Amador County 
1487536 73.5 28.4 20239.1 52419. 4 New York County 
220756 1354.5 523.0 163.0 422.1 Niagara County51 
Table 6. Land Area, Population, and Density for States and Counties:  
1990 
 
The preceding sections of this table classify the population by square mile and square 
kilometer and then by States and counties within the State.  In order to be useful for my 
formula, it should be categorized by population by square mile or square kilometer and then 

















                                                 


























8,008,278 7,322,564 685,714 9.4 1 1 
Los Angeles, 
Calif. 
3,694,820 3,485,398 209,422 6.0 2 2 
Chicago, Ill. 2,896,016 2,783,726 112,290 4.0 3 3 
Houston, 
Tex. 
1,953,631 1,630,553 323,078 19.8 4 4 
Philadelphia, 
Pa. 
1,517,550 1,585,577 68,027 4.3 5 5 
Phoenix, 
Ariz. 
1,321,045 983,403 337,642 34.3 10 6 
Table 7. Top 50 Cities in the U.S. by Population and Rank 
          52 
 
The section of the preceding table does not show the density factor, but surely alludes to 
the fact that the population of more than eight million in New York City continues to attract 
terrorists who are looking for a suitable target.    
In order for my formula to work, a table with the following criteria, ranked in 
descending order must be established:   
 
 
                                                 
52 Top 50 Cities in the U.S. by Population and Rank, retrieved January 16, 2004, from 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0763098.html 
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Land Area, Population, and Density for States and Cities 
Population Population / Sq. Mi. Name 
   




To develop a correct threat matrix of an entity, you must have access to the appropriate 
intelligence.  Not working in or having access to the intelligence sector, it is difficult to 
determine precisely how this should happen.  Using a theoretical approach, I will propose a 
process that I feel will work.  There are several ways to approach the threat aspect; one way 
appears to be the most feasible.    
First, the responsibility of creating a threat matrix can be assigned to the Department of 
Homeland Security.  They are supposed to have the correct, up-to-date data to support such an 
endeavor.  Officials from the DHS confer regularly with the DoD, DOJ, CIA and FBI as well as 
other Federal intelligence agencies.  In theory, they should be able to develop an accurate 
matrix.  Since the threat entity of the nation changes constantly, this should be the last factor 
incorporated into the formula and be presented just before the allocation goes for a vote.  Just as 
the threat changes from year to year, this part of the formula must change, too.  The biggest 
drawback to this approach is that there is no input from the States and locals, something that is 
always a contentious subject.   
The second factor to incorporate into this part of the formula is that municipalities can 
develop their own threat matrix from the information they have.  It should include surveillance, 
intelligence and other information that the municipality has been able to gather.  It is likely that 
this matrix will not be as accurate as one developed by the Federal Government, since it will not 
have all available intelligence.  One advantage of this approach is that it would foster buy-in 
from the States and local municipalities, since they were part of the process and their 
information was used.  The biggest disadvantage is that the final outcome would not truly 
35 
dictate an accurate threat matrix for the country and that is what we ultimately are trying to 
accomplish.  
A third process--and what I think would be the most viable one--is to facilitate a joint 
process, a Federal/State/local tie-in to develop the matrix.  You could have a group of 
intelligence agents from each State, including the District of Columbia and Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, plus the U.S. Territories, along with representatives from the top 25 areas of 
population densities (cities) and join them with representatives from all of the Federal branches 
of intelligence agencies.  In essence this would form a National Information and Analysis 
Center (NISAC).  This group would and should work on tracking the threats for many reasons, 
not just to develop this formula, but as an asset to the law enforcement community and the 
entire country.  They should have intimate knowledge of all the terrorist activities that threaten 
this country.  This group should be devoted to the problem of terrorism at all times. 
Washington State has incorporated some criteria into the allocation of funds in their 
2004 ODP State Homeland Security program to region/counties by using threat as a criteria.  
They need to be commended by taking the lead in doing so.  The following threat matrix 
incorporates their thinking by using measurable criteria.53  There may be other threat criteria 
that are used by intelligence agencies that are measurable, and if so they should be added to the 













                                                  
53 Washington State Military Department, Military Division, presentation titled FY 2004 ODP State 
Homeland Security Program resource Distribution Algorithm, provided by Glen Woodbury division director, 
March 21, 2004.  
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E.  VULNERABILITY 
 
The aspect of vulnerability also brings up another difficult criterion to measure.  How do 
you know if you are vulnerable?  How do you know that you have taken the necessary steps to 
reduce and eliminate the vulnerability?  How do you know when you have enough protection?  
Is it when there are no more attacks?  Is it when there are no more attempted attacks?  Is it when 
there are attacks but no one dies?  Is it when there are attacks and only a few people die?  What 
is the level of protection that will be acceptable?   
Six people were found dead and 1,042 people were injured. The authorities 
believe that the bombers drove two vehicles into the underground parking 
garage, transferred the explosives into one vehicle and drove off in the other one. 
The explosion caused over $500 million in damage. The World Trade Center 
remained closed for close to a month.54 
This is one account of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.  Obviously, the 
country was vulnerable, but the destruction wasn’t enough to change the thinking of those in 
charge.  Will this country accept the fact that if a terrorist group wants to have some influence, 
there is nothing that can be done to prevent some acts from occurring?   
Is the aspect of domestic terrorism vs. international terrorism a question that should be 
addressed?  Oklahoma City left a substantial number of Americans dead. 
Rescue workers pulled 169 bodies from the rubble, some of them children from a 
daycare inside the building. Hundreds were injured.55 
This event certainly showed that the United States was vulnerable, but 169 people dead 
didn’t change our minds regarding how we should approach terrorism.   
Not until 3,110 people died in the attacks of September 11th did this country start to “get 
it.”  Currently, it appears that the allowable vulnerability level is set very high.  How long will 
that last?  If there are no more attacks, will the funding and programs die out?   Does the next 
attack have to be a nuclear device or a widespread biological weapon to continue the high level 
                                                 
54 Blackwood, Ryan, February 26, 1993 - World Trade Center Bombing, retrieved January 26, 2004, from 
http://members.tripod.com/bblink/wtc.html 
55 Clark, Tony, The worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil: April 19, 1995, retrieved January 26, 2004, from 
http://www.cnn.com/US/OKC/daily/9512/12-30/index.html 
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of protection?  Will the priority shift to Social Security reform?  Will Medicare dictate shifting 
massive amounts of money away from Homeland Security? 
If you look around the world there are many terrorist groups that have caused havoc in 
many areas, some for a long time.  Is the American population capable of accepting some 
terrorism?  They have in the past.  Israel certainly accepted the stark realism that its citizens will 
have to live with the fear--if not actual terrorist attacks--probably forever.  The French are still 
victims of terrorist acts caused first by colonizing Algeria and now by supporting the secular 
government that is in power there.  This question of how much terrorism or, better yet, what 
level of vulnerability to terrorism, is acceptable, is the foundation of this section.  I propose that 
there is no acceptable level.  Any acceptable level will be a wedge upon which terrorist cowards 
will try to expand.  Only when the United States continues to take this hard line will the World 
“get it.”  The cost of this will be extremely high and will have to be sustained over a long period 
of time, but the alternative is a country that will always live in fear.  This is why it is important 
to ensure that the money gets to the correct places. 
So how do we fit vulnerability into a formula for funding first responders?  The 
President and the ODP have taken the first steps in this process and must be commended for 
their leadership in this area.  The National Strategies published by the Administration put all 
players on the same page.  By making the urban areas establish a multi-year strategic plan 
regarding how they intend to use the monies, ODP is proceeding in the correct manner.  This 
plan, in part, is based on the threat and how the municipality is reducing vulnerability to that 
threat.   
The following is a vulnerability matrix that could be used in the formula for assigning 
funds.  The category of number of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive 
(CBRNE) sites was taken from the work of Washington State56 and the category of accessibility 
and building composition is taken directly from the CARVER2 model.57  There are certainly 
other vulnerability criteria that could be used.  This is an example of what a vulnerability matrix 
could look like. 
                                                 
56 Washington State Military Department, Military Division, presentation titled FY 2004 ODP State 
Homeland Security Program resource Distribution Algorithm, provided by Glen Woodbury division director, 
March 21, 2004. 














First responders must be prepared to minimize the consequences of an attack on our 
country.  Much of this paper is based on that premise.  A new philosophy that has been 
introduced recently is to use first responders in a prevention role.  The term, “first preventer” 
has been introduced into the literature and the prospect needs to be defined. 
As the example citation makes clear, the term first preventers is based on the 
existing phrase first responders (1980), the first official personnel on the scene of 
an accident, attack, or disaster. Much of the discussion on the structure and 
funding of the Department of Homeland Security has focused on turning first 
responders into first preventers by giving them access to some of the resources 
normally available only to the security and intelligence communities. For 
example, by coordinating databases, local police would have the ability to run 
extensive background checks on suspicious individuals.58 
My premise is that if a municipality doesn’t involve itself in a prevention role then they 
should not be eligible for federal funds.  This proposal should not only should include law 
enforcement, but other agencies as well.  Fire departments are a natural extension of the 
program.  Their inspectors are inside buildings all the time.  They are allowed access to areas 
where law enforcement entities must: 
• Be invited in. 
• Have exigent circumstances. 
• Or obtain a warrant.   
Not only do fire departments have access to buildings while performing fire inspections, 
but they are on the street responding to and returning from fires and emergencies all of the time.  
In New York City alone, the Fire Department responded to 2,159,357 calls for assistance during 
                                                 
58 The Word Spy website, retrieved January 18, 2003, from 
http://www.wordspy.com/words/firstpreventers.asp 
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2003 and provided 183,403 Fire Code Regularity Inspections.59  This equated to a lot of time 
interacting with the people who live, work and visit the city.  We need to teach our “First 
Preventers” to look for the signs of terrorist activities.    
The following may be the first mention of funding such a program.  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has had, and continues to 
have, a cornerstone role in better securing the homeland from all threats: natural 
or human-made. It has been a mere seven months since FEMA became a part of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but DHS and FEMA have made 
good progress in securing the homeland. With strong bipartisan support in 
Congress, we provided more than $4 billion in equipment and training to the first 
preventer and first responder communities, all within the last six months.60 
As this program is developed, we should look to incorporate other agencies that have 
extensive contact with the public as well.  One example that comes to mind is the Department of 
Buildings.  The program could be expanded to the public sector as well.  Utilities and delivery 
companies such as the postal service, UPS, Fed Ex, etc. certainly could be represented in this 
initiative.  This will continue to increase the vigilance of many people and allow many more 
eyes and ears to focus on the prevention aspect of terrorism.  
The thought of not allowing or limiting funds to municipalities that do not partake in a 
“first preventer” role would mark a dramatic shift.  There may be a huge pushback but the same 
approach is incorporated into Federal HSPD-5 which will require adoption of the National 
Incident Command System (NIMS) as a condition to receive funds in the Federal FY 05 budget.   
Beginning in fiscal year 2005, Federal departments and agencies shall make 
adoption of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for 
providing Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or other 
activities.61 
The process of adopting NIMS is moving forward, and the requirement for “first 
preventor” programs should be incorporated into future requirements for grant funding. 
                                                 
59 Fire Department City of New York Annual Report 2003 
60 FEMA Update The View From the Top, retrieved February 5, 2004, from 
http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/o/novo03/novo03a.html 
61Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD–5 page 283, retrieved February 5, 2004, from  
http://library.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/dhs/HSPD5.pdf 
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The need for a community to have a robust system of detecting and preventing terrorist 
attacks is mandatory.  This has to be part of any future funding formula that is produced by the 
Department of Homeland Security.  This is the only way to make sure that municipalities are 
trying to stop attacks.  There also has to be a provision in the formula for not penalizing 
communities that do a good job.  Otherwise we may get the sentiment that if we prevent 
terrorist acts from occurring we will have our funding cut. What is the motivation for preventing 
events from occurring?  This section of the grant process should include a provision for at least 
partial salary reimbursement to communities that have a successful prevention program. 
I propose a few ideas in my matrix for preventability.  Many of these are not tried and 
true but some have showed promise and are outlined in the following section on best practices.  
When communities are protecting farm fields, monuments like Mount Rushmore or the New 
Years Eve ceremony in New York City, there has to be a plan in place to reduce the 
vulnerability from attack.  This plan needs to have a prevention component.  Whether it is flying 
random flights over the corn fields, having federal park police conducting random sweeps of the 
monument, or having fire and police departments walking in the crowds in Times Square with 
radiological meters, all have a preventability component to them.  All of these activities make it 
harder for terrorists to perpetrate an attack as well as a component to apprehend criminals, thus 
preventing crime.  If the crime that is stopped, prevented is terrorist related so much the better. 
The second part of this initiative is to see if the prevention programs are working.  This 
may take time and a statistical analysis must be completed.  An entire set of metrics must be 
developed.  As with the above criteria preventability is no different and will need a group of 
subject matter experts to develop out fully.  This set of criteria is beyond the scope of this paper.  
The matrix below is a first attempt to create a measurable set of criteria.  The following, a 


















Figure 8.   Prevention Hierarchy 
 
G. BEST PRACTICES 
 
I will present a number of best practices that have been instituted during the past few 
years and have shown promise in the area of prevention.  The need to make these practices 
available to others should be incorporated in the state and local directorate at the DHS.  There 
are a number of communities that have been actively seeking and establishing prevention 
initiatives.  I will discuss a few that appear to be making a difference. 
Los Angeles has taken the lead in this area under the initiative of Sergeant John Sullivan 
when they instituted the LA Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group Model in 1996.  As 
Sullivan describes the mission of the group, we see how the vision of an all-inclusive task force 
can work.  
The Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group is a 
multilateral, multidisciplinary effort to monitor open source data to identify 
trends and potential threats, monitor specific threat information during periods of 
heightened concern, assess potential targets, and perform net assessments to 
guide decision-making during actual events. 
We bring in each discipline, law enforcement, fire, health, we bring in the FBI, 
and they all form part of the command architecture. We also bring in outside 
agencies to participate in the process….  We rely on the members of the 
InterAgency Board [for Standardization and InterOperability], the Defense 
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Consequence Management Systems Office; in fact, members of those different 
entities serve as adjunct members of our Terrorism Early Warning Group.62 
What appears to have helped this group is the multi-agency approach and a reliance on 
using only open source information.  By doing so, the process that slows down many 
investigations is eliminated and promotes quicker assessments and actions.  Many other 
communities are looking at the LA model for use in their communities.  
I feel the Nation is receptive to accepting the importance of prevention.  Some 
municipalities are accepting it at a faster rate than others.  If you look at the web site of the New 
York State Office of Public Security, there is a list of prevention activities that have been 
initiated.  I will take just one as an example, again because of the inter-agency approach to 
solving a problem. 
Governor Pataki announced the first results of a Fraudulent Documents Task 
Force in Queens, which stemmed from a coordinated effort undertaken by the 
Office of Public Security, the Queens District Attorney, the New York State 
Police, the New York City Police Department, the Department of Motor 
Vehicles, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department, 
New York State Inspector General's Office and the Social Security 
Administration Inspector General's Office. Hundreds of arrests have been 
generated as a result of this operation which was designed to take down 
fraudulent ID mills operating in New York, and combat the illegal acquisition of 
state driver's licenses or non-driver ID's and other terrorism precursor crimes. 
The Task Force has continued its work in interdicting terrorism precursor crimes 
in other New York counties and has become a national model for multi-
jurisdictional counter-terrorism efforts by law enforcement. [July 2002]63  
The New York Police Department web site lists numerous activities that are being used 
to deter terrorist activities (thus, hopefully, preventing terrorist events from occurring).  The 
department has initiated an operation named Atlas.  The following is an abstract of what the 
initiative contains: 
With the raising of the national alert level from yellow to orange, the New York 
City Police Department has stepped up anti-terrorism precautions under 
Operation Atlas. Under Operation Atlas, the Police Department has launched a 
coordinated defense of the city, using regular patrols as well as police officers 
                                                 
 62 Sullivan, John P., Integrated Threat and Net Assessment: The L.A. Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group 
Model, retrieved January 31, 2004, from, http://www.rand.org/nsrd/bioterr/pdf/cp-Sullivan.pdf 
63 New York State Office of Public Security website, retrieved on January 31, 2004 from 
http://www.state.ny.us/security/response.html 
43 
equipped with heavy weapons to safeguard landmarks, houses of worship, 
bridges, tunnels, subways, and the transportation system generally. The alert 
level in New York City was already at orange, indic[a]ting a high risk of attack. 
Operation Atlas has been underway since the war in Iraq began in March 2003. 
The staffing and assignments of Operation Atlas change with changing 
conditions.  Operation Atlas has received high marks from the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, who called it a "model for other communities to 
follow." Secretary Ridge also stated that, “there is no city in this country that 
does a better job of working across the board to prevent terrorism than the City 
of New York."64 
Some of the components of the operation can be instituted into any community with 
little or no financial costs associated with them.  They involve moving patrols around the city in 
a random manner.  By moving them around, the police department is able to cover more areas 
with fewer personnel.  If a terrorist group is scouting out its next attack and observes one of 
these roving teams, the hope is that the group will abandon that target and move to another.  
These actions accomplish two things: 
• Prevent an attack from occurring. 
• Allow more time to ascertain the individuals who are plotting the attack and, 
hopefully, that will lead to apprehension.65 
 
Heavily armed HERCULES teams are deployed randomly throughout the city.66 
 
                                                 
64 NYPD website, retrieved on February 5, 2004, from http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/atlas.html 
65 Guerrira, Vincent, Capt. NYPD, interviewed by author, February 3, 2004. 
66 NYPD website, retrieved on February 5, 2004, from http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/atlas.html 
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There is evidence that many criminals who commit petty crime are linked to terrorist 
groups.  The Police Department of the City of New York has instituted a program in the subway 
system that has been very successful in apprehending low-level criminals. This now allows the 
police to question them and run background checks for links to terrorist organizations. 
Train Order Maintenance Sweeps,” TOMS”, are deployed to arrest fare evaders 
and others, whose initial low-level offences are often precursors of more serious 
crimes in the subway system.  TOMS may discourage or even intercept a 
terrorist attack.67 
The NYPD web site also shows a sense of cooperation within other agencies for a 
coordinated effort in terrorism prevention programs. 
HAMMER teams, police and fire department experts in hazardous materials, are 
deployed jointly.68 
HAMMER “Hazardous Assessment Mitigation Mobile Emergency Response” teams 
first were formed during the anthrax attacks on the City of New York in the fall of 2001.  It was 
realized that it would take a concerted effort by multiple agencies to be able to secure a sample, 
mitigate the scene, transport the sample to a testing facility and investigate the multiple events 
occurring on a daily basis.  These teams then were expanded to cover many of the special events 
that occur in the city on a regular basis.  The United States Tennis Open playoff and World 
Series games played in recent years are a few events where HAMMER teams have been 
deployed.  
 
H. COMBINING FACTORS 
 
Now that we have a comprehensive list of comparative factors to review, we still have to 
decide how to allocate the funds.  It would be easy to say you need to get into the top 10 to be 
funded, but that would exclude most of the country and certainly not get favorable support from 
Congress.   
So, my proposal would work on a sliding scale where the top 10 entities would receive 
50 percent of the funding; the second 10 would receive 25 percent of the funding; the next 10 
                                                 
67 NYPD website, retrieved on February 5, 2004 from http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/atlas.html 
68 NYPD website, retrieved on February 5, 2004 from http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/atlas.html 
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would receive 13 percent of the funding the next 10 would receive six percent of the funding; 
and so on.  This approach is unique because as the system develops and the threats and 
vulnerability change the appropriation to municipalities will change.  As the threat changes, the 
appropriation changes and then the amount of funding to different municipalities will change.  
As this process continues, it removes politics from the equation.  It truly is based on criticality, 
population density, threat, vulnerability and the prevention activities of an entity.  This system 
would provide the nation with an approach that allocates money where it is needed.  It is a 
system that will change the amount a municipality receives from year to year based on hard and 


















Strong support exists within the DHS and Congress for change in the current system for 
allocating grant funds for homeland security.  The nation is ready to enact a better, need-driven 
formula.  Need-oriented criteria are used in the allocation of funds by other US agencies (and by 
nations around the world).  Need is also being used by a number of States to disburse homeland 
security funds to local municipalities at the present time.  These communities are looking for 
more guidance and better ways to measure whether the criteria they are using are correct, or 
whether there is a better approach to allocate funds.  The Federal Government needs to take a 
leadership role in this regard. 
I have proposed that the DHS adapt the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to build out a 
formula for grant allocation.  The AHP takes complex problems and decomposes them into 
criteria that can be applied and measured, by using objectives and sub-objectives.  The AHP has 
been used for over 30 years in many fields that have the same or greater degree of complexity as 
homeland security.  There is no reason why it cannot be used in developing improved formulas 
for homeland security grant allocation.   
The need for subject matter experts in all the criteria incorporated in my proposed 
formula will be essential to apply it effectively.  No one person will have all of the answers.  I 
believe the most important contribution of this thesis is my effort to describe the process by 
which decision makers might collaborate, within the AHP framework, to build the necessary 
funding allocation formula. It is clear, however, that a better, more needs-based allocation 
system can and must be developed. This thesis proposed an integrated sect of criteria that could 
be used to build such a system, and a way to weight those criteria that supports the 
Administration’s Homeland Security Strategy.  The thesis also examines emerging best 
practices that can be taken into account in measuring the effective use of funds, and applying 
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